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1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis seeks to critically interrogate whether electronic surveillanccintcrnct
monitoring, telephone tapping and polygraph testing can be regarded as a violation of
the right to privacy. It further interrogates workplace disputes arising from these
practices. The thesis will rely on various cases to illustrate the different situations
where it was found justifiable to 'invade' privacy as well as situations where it was
found unjustifiable. This invasion to privacy will also be linked to management
prerogative to manage in relation to the right to privacy.
The right to privacy is a concept that has not been in existence for a long time,
especially in the employment context. However it has recently attracted much
attention as people become more and more technologically oriented. Unfortunately
technology by its nature makes it easy for those aspects of employment that are
traditionally regarded as part of the domain of an employee privacy to be accessible to
others.
In addition the employment relationship by its nature dictates that there are those who
manage and those who are managed. Those who manage have certain prerogatives
that are inherent in the nature of their responsibility. However human beings have
certain expectations values and lights. The right to privacy may be regarded as one of
the most comprehensive and valued light by persons in the 21 Century. It is crucial
not to disregard the fact that the light to privacy, like all the other, lights is not
absolute. When an employee enters the domain of the workplace he or she should not
expect the same degree of privacy that may be enjoyed in the domain of their h0111e.
The law provides that the employer has the light to manage the work canied out by
employees at the workplace but pays little account to the light to pnvacy of
employees.
The thesis will consider the following topics
1) The right to privacy in general
2) Managerial Prerogative at the workplace
3) Workplace Discipline by management
4) Workplace Discipline and Telephone Abuse
5) Workplace Discipline and Internet Abuse
6) Workplace and Electronic Surveillance
7) Workplace discipline andpolygraphic testing
8) Conclusion
In conclusion, there will be a discussion of the various aspects that are of paramount
importance in determining whether there has been invasion of privacy in the
execution management responsibility as well as the possible challenges facing both
employers and employees..
?
2 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy is a relatively new leg al concept. Legal decisions supporting
privacy were based on property rights and contracts. An independent right to privacy
was not recognised. According toBaase, I an articl e called 'The Right to Privacy' was
written in 1890 by Samuel Wan-en and Louis Brandeis (later a Supreme Court Justice)
which argued that privacy was distinct from other rights and needed more protection.
In the decision ofOlmstead v The United States' Justice Brandeis held that 'privacy
is the right to be left alone; the most comprehensive right and the most valued by
civilised men' - a legal shield which could be asserted by the indi vidual against the
prying eyes of the public. In the employment context it is viewed as the appropriate
concept for guiding the regulation of aspects of employment relationship, particularly
the use by management of certain techniques, such as monitoring of electronic
communication.
Faleri 3 mentions that in the legisl ation of all European Union member states the right
to privacy is not seen sitnply as a right which must not be infringed by third parties,
but rather as a right of data subj ects to decide and to supervise the use that is made of
their own personal data: the legi slature clearly wishes to give the data subject an
active role.
The fact that privacy has emerged as an important societal virtue is demonstrated by
the inclusion of the right against arbi trary interference with privacy Article 17 of the
J S Baase A Gift ofFire (1997) 64
?'Olmstead v The United States 277 US 43 8 (192 7)
3 Faleri C Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal; Informa tion Tec hnology and Workers Privacy
Public and Pri vate Regulation ' Vo l 23, No2, Winter 2002 , 520
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Right to Privacy appears in
Article 11 of the American Convention on Human Rights. It is a fundamental right
protected by the Legal Order of the European Union.
2.1 The meaning of privacy
Privacy is a basic human need that is fundamental to the development and
advancement of both a free society and a mature and stable personality for an
individual4. This right is valued as a right by persons, both in relation to intrusion by
the state and as far as other people is concerned. It is also a right which is inextricably
intertwined with human dignity. The right to privacy is therefore based on human
dignity and has as its objective the preservation for each individual of the choice of
when and how much he or she will allow others to know about his or her activities.
Remp' mentions that the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) In its 1994
Congregational Report stated that
Privacy refers to the social balance between an individual 's right tokeep
information confidential and the societal benefit derived froIn sharing
information, and how this balance is codified to give individuals the means to
control personal information,
Neethling" on the other hand states that;
Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by exclusion from
publicity. This condition includes all the personal facts which the person
4 G.E Devenish A COnlel71pOrW 1· on the South African Bill ofRighis (1999) 135
S M Remp Ann The 2/" Centur y: Meeting the Challenges to Business Education (1999) 117
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himself at the relevant time determines to be excluded from the knowledge of
outsiders and in respect of which he evidences a will for privacy.
Cockhead maintains that it would appear like this definitions of the modern law of
invasion of privacy, arose out of a need to protect the individual's dignity and mental
tranquility of people in a sophisticated and developing society where technology has
enabled the former boundaries of privacy to be invaded.
2.2 Constitutional right to privacy
The right to privacy in South Africa is set out in Section 14 of the Constitutiohas
follows;
Everyone has the right to privacy which includes the right not to have-
(a) their possession or hom e searched
(b) their property searched
(c) their possessions seized or
(d) the privacy oftheir communication infringed
Section 14 is divided into two parts. The first part guarantees a general right to
pnvacy and the second protects against specific infringement of privacy, namely
searches and seizures and infringements of the privacy of communication. In most
cases searching of one's person, hOlne, or property or intercepting one's
communication will result in infringement of Section 14. Nevertheless since the
protection against searches and seizures is a subordinate clement of the light to
privacy, the constitution 's protection is triggered only when an applicant shows that a
fi Neethling et al Neethling's Law ofPersonality (1996) 36
7 A Cockhead A Critical Analysis ofLaw ofPrivacy With Ref erence To Invasion OfPrivacy Of
Public Figures (1990) 5
XConstitution of the Republic of South Afiic a Act 108 of 1996 (1996 Constitution)
search, seizure or interception of communication has infringed the general light to
. 9
pnvacy.
2.3 Legitimate expectation of privacy
A legitimate expectation of privacy entails that one must have a subjective
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as objectively reasonable. The
subjective expectation cornponent recognizes that nobody can complain about an
infringement of privacy if they have consented explicitly or implicitly in having their
privacy invaded. Consequently it is difficult to assess the kinds of privacy expectation
that society would regard as objectively reasonable.
The Constitutional Court provided some guidelines with regard to the issue of
reasonable objectivity. InBernstein v Bester No!! which dealt with personal privacy
and the right not to be subject to the scizureof private possessions or the violation of
private communication, the couli observed;
The truism that no right is to be considered absolute implies that from the
outset of interpretation, each right is always limited by every other right
accruing to another citizen. In the context of privacy this would mean that
it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as hislher family life, sexual
preferences and home enviromnent which is shielded from erosion by
conflicting lights of the community. Thi s implies that community lights
and the rights of fellow memb ers place a corresponding obligation on a
citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards
identifying a concrete member of civil society. Privacy is acknowledged
~J Dc Waa l, Currie I & Eras mus G; The Bill of Rights Handbook (200 1) 268
10 Co llie r D ' Wo rkplace Privacy in the Cybcr Age' ILl 2002 Vol23 Oc tobe r 1750
in the truly personal realm but as a person moves into communal relations
and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of the
personal space sluinks accordingly.
With due respect the Court inBernstein was more or less stating the obvious. What
needed a closure and comprehensive interrogation was the extent to which limitation
of substantive right is permissible. Emphasis should also have been given to the
cultural context of the light to privacy. This is crucial because in communitarian
societies such as those found in Africa, the right to privacy is seriously compromised
because the concept of individuality is alien to societal values.
To illustrate this point in the judgernento/' Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental
Council of South Afi 'ica/2 the court emphasised, in relation to business undertakings,
that the more public the undertaking and the more closely regulated, the more
attenuated would the right to privacy be and the less intense any possible invasion. It
also stated that in the case of any regulated business enterprise, the proprietor's
expectation of privacy in relation to the premises, equipment, materials and records
must be attenuated by the obligation to comply with reasonable regulations and to
tolerate the administrative inspections that are an integral part of an effective regime
of regulation. People involved in such an undertakings must know from the beginning
that their activities will be monitored. The Court referred to a Canadian judgement
where this point was well articulated:
11 Bernst ein I' Bester 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) para 67
12Misll:1' I' Interim Medical and Dental Counci l ofSouth Af rica (1998) SA 11 27 (CC) 27
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The degree of pnvacy the citizen can reasonably expect may vary
significantly depending on the activity that brings him or her into contact with
the state. In a modem industrial society it is generally accepted that many
activities in which individuals can engage must nevertheless to a greater or
lesser extent be regulated by the state to ensure that the individual pursuit of
his or her self-interest is compatible with the community's interest in the
realisation of collective goals and aspirations.
In Investigating Directorate; Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor
Distributors13 the Court held that, the statements in Berstein and presumably in Mistry
do not mean that the people no longer retain a tight to privacy in the social capacities
in which they act. Therefore, when people are in their offices, in their cars or on
mobile telephones they still enjoy the tight to be left alone by the state unless certain
conditions are met.
De Waal14 states that, the tight to privacy seeks to protect three related COnCelTIS:
(2.3.1) the tight to privacy seeks to protect certain aspects of one's life in respect of
which one is entitled to be left alone; one's body, certain places such as one's home
and certain relationships such as marital sexual or other intimate relationships.
(2.3.2) It also aims to protect the opportunities for an individual to develop his or her
personality and therefore extends to certain forms of individual and personalself
realisation or self fulfillment.
(2.3,3) It seeks to protect the ability of indi viduals to control use of private
information about themselves.
: ~ Investigating Directorate; Serious Economic Of fences v Hvundai Motor Distributors 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC)
De Waal (refer note 9 above) 270
The right to privacy also enables one to develop and maintain relations with other
human beings so as to satisfy one 's ability to relate to oneself.
2.4 The Right to be left alone
The right to be left alone is deemed as an important part of privacy when it comes to
an individual's body, home and family lifel ~ The rationale behind this right is that the
state and other people should have nothing to do with other people's intimate affail1t
The right to privacy recognizes that every individual is entitled to a sphere of personal
autonomy in which the law may not interfere. In the judgemenof Case v Minister of
Safety and Security17 the Court stated that:
what erotic material I may choose to keep within the privacy ofmy
home, and only for my personal use there, is nobody's business but
mine. It is certainly not the business of society or the state. Any ban
imposed on my possession of such material for that solitary purpose
invades the personal privacy which s13 of the Interim Constitution
guarantees that I shall enjoy.
It must be emphasised however that they may be situations when society has a
legitimate expectation to know what an individual possesses because sometimes the
interest of the individual and soci ety are intertwined. In emerging constitutional
democracies characterised by conservati ve attitudes the right to privacy needs to be
conceptualised and be broadly construed and applied. It would not be consistent with
the contemporary move of societies in emerging constitutional democracies to give
15 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) article 12 which states that no one shall be subjec ted to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family or home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everybody has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks
Jo De Waal (refer note 9 above) 271
J7 Case v Minister ofSafety and Security 1996 (3) SA 165 para 19
Q
the light to privacy blanket permission. The emerging constitutional democracies seek
to protect those areas that are considered to be of great societal concern such as child
porno graphy.
2.5 The Right to the development of the individual personality
Protection of privacy is fundamental for the individual to develop his/her personality.
The right to privacy protects the right of individuals to be or become, at the personal
level, the kind of person they want to be. The right to the development of the
individual personality includes among other things; the type of clothes one chooses to
wear, inscribed tattoos on their bodies and hairstyles. The concept of privacy includes
the right to institute and maintain relations with other human beings for the
satisfaction of one's personality or the ability of a person to relate to oneself and to
integrate with others in a worthwhile manner'".
2.6 Informational privacy
Protection of privacy is also crucial to protecting human dignity in the sense that it
guarantees the right of a person to have control over the use of plivate information.
Hence informational privacy is closely related to the right to dignity due to the fact
that publication of embarrassing information or information which places a person in
a false light has negative implications to the dignity of that person 19.
In its judgement in the MistlJlo case the Constitutional Court cited SOIne factors
which it considered imperative when dealing with informational privacy. The factors
are as follows; whether the information was obtained in an intrusive Inanner whether,
IX De Waal (refer note 9 above ) 275
19 Ibid 276
In
it was about intimate aspects of the applicant's personal life; whether it involved data
provided by the applicant for one purpose which was then used for another; whether it
was disseminated to the press or the general public or persons from whom the
applicant could reasonably expect such private information would be withheld.
2.7 Limitation of the right to privacy
The right to privacy is not absolute, and like all Chapter Two rights in the
Constitution it is subject to reasonable and justifiable limitations or restrictions in
terms of section 36 of the Constitution, by a law of general application to the extent
that it is reasonable andjustifiable in an open and democratic society, based on human
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including those
mentioned in the section.
When dealing with the issue of legitimacy of limitation the Constitutional Court's
view was articulated inSv Makwanyane" decision. In that judgement the Court held
as follows;
the limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and
necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing
values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. This is implicit
in the provisions of s33 (1) (lC). The fact that different rights have different
implications for democracy, and In the case of our
constitution for an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality', means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for
determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles can be established, but
the application of those principles to particular circumstances can only be
211 Mist ry \' Interim Medical and Dental Council ofSouth Africa (note12 above) para 51
21 S\' Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 104 .
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done on a case by case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of
proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different interests. In the
balancing process, the relevant considerations will include the nature of the
light that is limited and the importance to an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the light is limited and
the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation,
its efficacy and particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether
the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less
damaging to the light in question. In the process regard must be had to the
provisions of s33(1 )(IC), and the underlying values of the Constitution,
bearing in mind that, as a Canadian Judge has said, 'the role of the Court is not
to second-guess the wisdom of policy choices made by the legislators.
This paragraph has been summarized inS v BhulwQnQ22 as follows;
In sum, therefore, the court places the purpose, effects and importance of the
infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of the
infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The more substantial the
inroad into fundamental lights, the lnore persuasive the grounds of
justification must be.
The above quotations indicate that rights can only be limited if the party that is
infringing the light demonstrates that infringement is for very compelling reasons. A
compelling good reason is that the infringement serves a purpose that is considered
legitimate by all reasonable citizens in a constitutional democracy, The infringement
22 S v Bhulwana 1996(1 ) SA 388 (CC ) para J 8
2.1 See European Convention on Human Rights Art icle J 8
1)
must however not iITIpOSe costs that are disproportionate to the benefi ts that it
2.8 Searches and seizures
Searches and seizures involve a violation of a person's right to privacy. They must
only be concluded in terms of legislation that defines the power to search and seize.
The person conducting the search has to be issued with a search warrant . Any search
that does not have authority would be a constitutional violation. The other
requirement of reasonable grounds for justification was addressed in theHyundai25
judgement whereby the Constitutional Court held that for purposes of a preparatory
investigation, a search and seizure would not be constitutionally justifiable in the
absence of a reasonable suspicion that an offence had been COITIITIitted.
2.8.1. The constitutionality of laws authorising searches and seizures
The Criminal Procedure Acr'' is the ITIOSt important law which authorises searches
and seizures. Whereas the Act contains provisions, which are deemed in some
quarters to violate the light to privacy, such provisions are subject to the limitation
clause. There has to be compliance with Section 36 of the Constitution according to
which the authorizing law lTIUSt properly define the scope of the power to search and
seize. There also has to be prior authorisation of the search and seizure by an
independent authority. The Act also requires an independent authority to be persuaded
by evidence on oath that there are reasonable grounds for conducting the search.
24 De Waal (refer note 9 above) 162
25 Investigating Directorate; Serious Economic Offences I' Hvundai Motor Distribut ors (refer note 13 above)
26 Crimina l Procedur e Act of 1977; Sec tion 2 I (2)" .
The issue of prior authorization was addressed by theHigh Court in Park-Ross v
Director Office/or Serious Economic OjJencei 7 where the offices of a company were
raided and documents seized and copied in terms of section 6 of Serious Economic
Offences Actl17 of 1991.The seizure was effected after the Office of Serious
Economic Offences decided to hold an enquiry in terms of section 5 of the Act. The
Court held that section 6 of the Act cons tituted a violation of the right to privacy as
embodied in Section 131C. The Court findings were based on the fact that the value
protected by the law of search and seizure as in the United States and Canada is
. h h 28pnvacy rat er t an property .
2.9 Infringement of Privacy; Wrongfulness
An infringement of privacy can take place through acquaintance with personal facts
by outsiders contrary to the determination and will of the person whose right is
infunged. This acquaintance can take place through intrusion (or acquaintance with
private facts) and disclosure (or revelation of private facts) and disclosure (or
revelation of private facts). Ne ethling9 submits that the wrongfulness of an
infringement of privacy should mutatis mutandis be judged in the manner as that of
conduct infunging dignity and that of conduct as a result, the acquaintance with
private facts should be not only contrary to the subjective determination and will of
the prejudiced party, but at the sarne time viewed objectively, contrary to the views of
the community or unreasonableness.
~: High Court ill Park-Ross v Director Of fice / or Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C)
- See Kat: v United States 389 US 347 ( 1967)
29 Neeth1ing (refer note 6 above) 243
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2.10 Intrusion or acquaintance
Neethling" distinguishes between two types of intrusion namely acquaintance with
private facts (where such acquaintance is totally excluded or is limited to specific
person) and secondly (where acquaintance is permissible to an indeterminate but
limited number ofpersons).
(i) Private facts totally excluded or limited to specific persons
An acquaintance with one's private facts may be regarded as an infringement of
the right to privacy, simply because not every person has access to those facts.
There is an element of confidentiality and hence acquaintance with them is
contrary to the determination and wishes of the holder of the right as well as being
in conflict with the opinion of the community and thus wrongful.
(ii) Private facts available to indeterminate but limited number of persons
Acquaintance with personal facts available to an indeterminate but limited number
of persons is in principle not wrongful unless the acquisition is contrary to the
dictates of human nature and the composition of modern society. The
circumstances of each case will dictate whether an intrusion is wrongful or not.
2.11 Disclosure or revelation
The infringement of privacy through an act of disclosure comes about where there
is revelation of plaintiffs personal and private facts to third party by outsiders,
30 lbid 243
1 'i
which although known to the outsider nonetheless remains private. Neethling"
distinguishes three types of disclosure and submits that in all of them the question
of infringement of privacy arises only if the plaintiff is identified with the
disclosed facts . The disclosures identified are as follows:
(i) Private facts acquired through wrongful intrusion
Acquisition of private facts through a wrongful act of intrusion and a disclosure of
those facts constitute an infringement of the right to privacy. In the judgement of
Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pt;1 Ltd v Janit32 where the Court had to
decide whether the respondents were entitled to use information on tape
recordings which had been stolen from the applicants by a third party in civi l
litigation between the parties. The Judge was of the opinion that a couli in civil
proceedings should have a discretion to exclude even relevant information as
admissible evidence. The findings were motivated as follows:
modern technology enables a litigant to obtain access to the most private
and confidential discussions of his opponent; his telephones can be tapped,
a listening device can be planted in the boardroom (or bedroom) of the
opponent, documents can be Photostatted, tape recordings of meetings
stolen ..... .It is poor solace to the litigant whose privacy has unlawfully
been invaded by those means that the perpetrator of the wrong may face
criminal prosecution if the evidence so obtained can be used in the civil
proceedings in which they are engaged. In my view, as a matter of public




Similarly, it is unacceptable to summarily disregard all evidence wrongfully or
illegally obtained. The circumstances of each case should determine how a court
should exercise its discretion.
(ii) Confidential relationships
According to Neethlingr' the wrongfulness of conduct becomes pr<?blelnatic where
only some specific individuals are privy to private facts in accordance with the
determination and will of the plaintiff and consciously disclose the facts either to a
single person or a small group of persons as opposed to mass publication. This may
not be contrary to convictions of the community since disclosure is harmless and in
accordance with human nature. A confidential relationship worthy of protection does
not arise only come about when a person is compelled to disclose personal facts to
another; it also COlnes about where there is agreement between the parties that private
facts disclosed will be confidential or secret and in such instances disclosure of the
private facts involved, apart from breach of contract, will also constitute an
infringement of the right to privacy'"
(iii) Mass publication
Neethling" maintains that with regard to mass publication, that is, disclosure to an
unlimited number of persons of facts intended to be accessible to specific persons
only, the publication thereof will in principle infringe the light to privacy. This is
more so because these facts are characterised by an element of confidentiality. It
32 Motor Industry Fund Admini strators (PM Lld I' Janit 1994 (3) SA 56 (W)




has been recognised that the light to privacy is an independent personality light,
therefore it can be accepted that in future the mass publication of private facts
obtained through a wrongful act of intrusion, or that is contrary to a legally
recognised confidential relationship, will probably be considered as an
infiingement of a light to privacy.
In the judgement ofMhlongo v Bailey'" the defendant, without the permission of
the plaintiff published the latter's photograph in a journal as part of an article on a
female singer. In the article it was averred that the plaintiff, who at the time of
publication was a school-teacher, and the singer were involved in an amorous
relationship. The plaintiff instituted action on the grounds of infringement of his
privacy and dignity. The Court held that the plaintiffs dignitas had been
infiinged.
Mass publication of private facts may be regarded as infringing private facts. In
the judgment ofNational Media Ltd v Bogoshf7 the Court held that the media will
only be afforded protection to the publication of material in which the public has
interest. In this case a question arose with respect to the modern approach. In my
opinion this seeks to strike a balance between the right to the reputation on the one
hand and the freedom of expression on the other. The debate whether the press
should be strictly liable for defamatory remarks it publishes was conducted within
the parameters of relevant constitutional provisions of the South Afiican
Constitution, namely section 15(1), which entrenches press freedom in specific
terms.
3(, Mhlongo l' Bailey 1958 1 SA 370 (W)
37 National Media Ltd \' Bogoslzi 1998(4) SA 1196 (SeA)
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It would seem that to hold press strictly liable for alleged defamatory remarks is
inappropriate in modem society based on a constitution that entrenches a bill of
rights and that guarantees certain rights of the press. Such a law is offensive to
modern thinking and ought to be closelyscrutinised by the courts.
The preferable view is that a balance needs to be struck between the right to
human dignity or reputation and freedom of expression under which freedom of
the press is subsumed. But it is one thing to state the necessity to balance the
above rights, and a totally different thing to actually do so. Quite often, depending
on the orientations of the judges no such balance is attempted, instead a
justification in favour of one of the above considerations is mounted. Those who
favour the freedom of expression consideration tend to place onerous conditions
on the plaintiff who have been recklessly injured by the press. For instance, it has
often been said that those who hold public office are expected to have a thick skin
because they voluntarily subjected themselves to public scrutiny and that they
should be able to accommodate stinging criticism, even if some may be factually
misguided. The cardinal issue is that there must not be any malice by the press
report. This line of reasoning sometimes over-privileges the freedom of
expression over the right to dignity.
In balancing the right to reputation and the freedom of expression there is no need
to adopt a rigid approach. The determining criteria in my view should be whether
in the circumstances of a parti cular case was the alleged defamatory statement
justifiable in a democratic society. Fram ed in this manner the courts would be
freed from the paralysis of analysis occasioned by treating the old and modern
defenses as biblical commandments cast in stone. The courts must develop
Iq
guidelines of how to strike a balance between freedom of the press to publish and
protection of people's reputations. It is indisputable that no democratic society can
permit the press to run vendettas against individuals who are powerless to arrest
falsehoods against them being published.
2.12 Justifying a right of employee privacy
Everybody values their privacy and employees are no exception to the rule. Crai~
has identified four justifications for recognizing a personal right of privacy in
individuals and they all have force in the employment context. He states that each is
premised on the promotion of a distinct social value. The four justifications are;
autonomy, dignity and well being, healthy relationship, and pluralism.
(i) Autonomy
Craig39 submits that privacy is often linked to the concept of autonomy, meaning the
ability of an individual to choose freely and independently his goals or relations.
Employment impacts significantly on an individual autonomy, as the very nature of
the employment offers some degree of control and subjects the employee to the
interest and objectives of the employer. This does not have to be regarded negatively
as since it comes with economic rewards for the employee which promote an
individuals autonomy and independence in society.
In addition Craig'" states that worker autonomy may be affected in two ways. Firstly a
management policy may threaten to penalize candidates/employees for activities
occurring outside the workplace which have a small bearing or even none on the
relationship to the legitimate management interests. For example, drug testing has
3~ Craig Privacy and Employment Law( 1999) 20
39 fbid 21
been criticized because employers may refuse to hire, or may discipline individuals
for their use of drugs away from the workplace. Secondly, the problem of employer
control over workers' private lives becomes more complex as on-duty and off-duty
time blurs. This was captured eloquently by Justice Blackmum inO 'Connor v
Ortega" when he stated the following
The reality of work in modem times, whether done by public or private
employees, reveals why a public employees' expectation of privacy in
the workplace should be carefully safeguarded and not slightly set-
aside. It is unfortunately all too true that the workplace has become
another home for most working Americans. Many people spend the
better part of their days and much more of their evenings at
work consequently, an employee's private life must intersect with
the workplace, for example, when the employee takes advantage of
work or lunch break to make personal telephone calls, to attend to
personal business, or to receive personal visitors in the office. As a
result, the tidy distinctions .....between the workplace and professional
affairs, on the one hand , and personal possessions and private activities
on the other, do not exist in reality.
Because the employment relationship places a great amount of control over individual
autonomy and independence, any management practice which exerts control over the
41l Ibid 21
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private interests of candidates/employees is cause for serious COnCelTI and need close
attention42.
(ii) Dignity and well being
Further more Craig" states that privacy is not only important because it provides
individuals with protection from social pressures for the purpose of autonomous
decision making but also because it affords everyone an environment where they can
free to be themselves. Individual's state of mind is preserved and promoted by the
protection of private life. Denial of privacy may result in some disturbance to an
individual normal state of being Management practices implicating private interests
may adversely affect the dignity and well being of candidate/employees.
(iii) Healthy Relationships
The emp loyment relationship is crucial to lTIOSt people and hence employment
transcends its contractual nature, and operates as a social relationship based on trust,
respect and good faith. Craig'" states that one labour group observed that;
It SeelTIS bite to say that a happy worker is likely a productive worker that
a worker who is accorded respect is likel y to return it ... ..On the other
hand, a worker who lTIUSt produce in an atmo sphere of distrust and lack of
consideration seems more likely to treat her or his employer in kind.
The issue of privacy has the potential to cause conflict between management and
employees, and a relationship that lacks trust is always difficult to manage,




Craig45 believes that privacy often brings about diversity, which is crucial to any
pluralistic, democratic society. The importance of pluralism in the privacy of
individuals, whether or not in their capacity as workers is a serious matter, Moreover
pluralisrn plays an important role in the workplace, where innovation is so critical to
the success of any organisation. Innovation occurs through industrial pluralism -the
fostering ofnew ideas and new approaches.
2.13 Conclusion
The light to privacy like all other lights needs to be protected but it is also subject to
limitation as enshrined in section 36 of the Constitution. The important issue is
balancing of interest since one lnust appreciate the fact that where there is interaction
with others the right to privacy is bound to shrink accordingly but at the same time
people should not be made to feel that they have no control over issues that they
consider private just because they have left the domain of their homes. Employees
spend a great deal of their time at work and naturally expect some reasonable degree
of privacy at work however this may pose a challenge for an employer to enforce his





Management and workers have different views and perceptions regarding the various
areas that constitute managerial prerogative. Management regards certain issues as
falling within their managerial prerogative and hence not subject to consultation, but
over time management has come torealise that good industrial relations requires that
there should be consultation between all the stake holders especially dealing with the
various mechanisms that an employer may want to introduce regarding discipline at
the work place. It is also undeniable that there is bound to be some overlap between
the employees privacy and the employers light to manage. It therefore becomes a
challenge to strike a balance between the two as succinctly captured by the Victorian
Law Reform COlnmissiort6 as follo ws:
Workplace privacy raises difficult questions about the appropriate balance to
be struck between employer' s claim to exercise management and control over
workers, and the lights of employees to have their autonomy and privacy
respected and to be treated with dignity.
Reinhard'f raises the point that the use of technology has added to an already existing
competition between the employer and the employeeHe states that on the one hand
there is the principle of inviolability of the employees private lives and the private
communication and on the other, the principl e of the employers ' lights to enjoy their
private property and their managerial lights to enjoy their private property and their
managerial powers of command.
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3.1. The term managerial prerogative
The term prerogative denotes a right or privilege, which belongs to a particular group
48 d fi . I .or persons. Barker and Holthausen e me managena prerogative as;
Those rights reserved to management which it feels are intrinsic to its
authority to manage, Management maintains that such rights are not subject to
collective bargaining nor do they require consultation with the union.
In the labour relationship employer prerogative entails the right to manage an
organisation. It refers to the right to make decisions regarding the aim of the
organisation and the ways in which it will achieve these aims, The decisions referred
to can be divided into two broad categories, namely the decisions about human
resources utilized by the organisation and decisions of an 'economic' or 'business'
nature. Decisions about human nature involve deciding on the number and types of
employees required, their terms and conditions of employment, where and how they
do their work and the supervision of their work. Decisions of an 'economic' or
'business' nature include decisions relating to the acquisition and/or use of physical
assets needed by the organisation and decisions regarding the aims of the
organisation, the products it produces or the services it produces. Managerial
prerogative is mostly regarded as being of speci al importance when dealing with
decisions regarding human resources utili zed by theorganisation. It is linked to the
ability of the employer to control the acti vities of employees in the workplace.
47 Reinhard J-I Comparative Labour Law & Policy Jou rnal; Inform ation Technology and Workers Priva cv ; Enforcement Vol
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In George v Liberty Life Association ofAfrica49 the court described the prerogative
of an employer as 'the totality of the capacity of an employer'. This characterisation is
with due respect rather vague . Managerial prerogative should strictly speaking be
confined to ordering production and other matters incidental thereto.
Jordaan 50 maintains that if any employer was asked to define the concept of
managerial prerogative his answer would likely be that it is has something to do with
the right to order production and labour. He states that on one hand the power to order
production can probably be explained in terms of the fact that the employer either
owns or in sorne manner controls , industrial capital, that is the material assets
employed in the production process. On the other hand the power to command human
resources cannot be justified on that basis. While the power to command production
rests on ownership or control of industrial capital , contract is the source of managerial
control over employees. Ownership or control of industrial capital does not legally
give the employer the light or the power to 'manage' employees or exercise control
over them, The light to manage and control property only extends to the object owned
or controlled, but does not include the right to manage or control persons.
3.2 The legal basis for managerial prerogative
There are a number of differing opinions on what constitutes the basis for managerial
prerogative. In order for employer prerogative to be legally enforceable it must have
its origin in the law. Lawyers find its origin in the contract of employment, which has
subordination of the employee to the authority of the employer as one of its elements.
This element creates the legal right for an employer to manage the employee as well
49Ceorge l' Liberty Life Assoc iation ofAfrica (1996) 17 IU 571 le, 582
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as the legal duty on the employee to adhere to the employer's instructions
51
. In
Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) & SA Commercial Catering & Allied
Workers Union52 the arbitrator explained the concept as follows:
It is true that the parties agree not only to a specified ambit of responsibility,
but also to an inevitable degree of subordination. This entails that, within the
limits of the employee's degree of subordination he or she is required to
submit to the employer's instructions.
This point is further ernphasised by Rycroff' who argues that:
The legal basis for managerial prerogative is generally acknowledged
to be the traditional law of master and servant infused into the
employment contract. This infusion has allowed the employer to fend
off threats by emplo yees to everyday control of the enterprise simply
because the employment contract is silent on a particular aspect of the
numerous contingencies arising in the course of employment.
It is imperative to note that the contract of employment cannot be separated from the
economic and social realities within which it comes into being. The legal foundation
for the employer decision-making power is the contract, but this light is reinforced by
the employer's greater economic power and social position.
51 Ibid 3
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However, as pointed out previously Jordad 4 does not support the argument and
maintains the position that ownership or control of industrial capital does not legally
give the employer the right or the power to 'manage' employees or exercise control
over them. The position undermines the position of powe~' of capital. Capital by
definition is more powerful than the individual. Whilst it may be legally correct that
ownership of capital does not give the employer the right to employees in actual fact
it does because it is the employer who is capable of dismissing the employee and not
the other way round.
Flanders55 believes that the employers' prerogative is based on the fact that only its
managers have the necessary skills and expertise to manage present-day activities
with their large work-forces and advanced technology. The light to manage is derived
from the market power of the employer and that no equality of bargaining power in
the labour market prevails in an employment relationship as an employer has capital,
information and access to legal advice.Strydorrr" believes that there is some merit in
the argument that explains the practical realities of the subordinate position of an
employee in an employment relationship, but however these social and economic
realities do not confer upon the employer a legal right to manage its employees, The
other ground for employer's prerogative is the bureaucratic organization of an
enterprise. When an employee joi ns an enterpri se, he or she forms part of a
bureaucratic organisation in which he or she yields little or no bargaining power to
those above in the system of ranks.Strydom" is however quick to point out that this
ground as a legal basis for managerial prerogative must be rejected as bureaucratic
54Jordan (refer 50 above) 2
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organisation does not confer a legal duty on the employee to obey instruction from
supervisors. It is merely a decision-making structure devised by the employer to
exercise the maximum amount of control over the employees.
The arguments as submitted byStrydom make reference to the economic and social
realities of the employment relationship. In most instances the relationship is between
a bearer of power and someone with little or no bargaining power. The degree to
which managerial prerogative exists depends on the power relationship. Those with
economic power are able to influence the ones with little or no economic power.
Another factor is the prevalent competition amongst job seekers particularly when the
economy is in a downward phase and unemployment is high. These social and
economic considerations do not however provide a legal basis for the employer to
manage hislher employees, and conversely, for the employees to obey themployers'
instructions.
Jordaan58 on the other hand maintains that whether management tights are expressed
or implied, the tight to manage is generally seen as being a cluster of substantive
tights. He states that however it has been asserted that tight to manage is, in fact , a
procedural tight
The right to direct, where it involves wages, hours or working conditions, is a
procedural light. It does not imply some light over and above labor's light. It
is a recognition of the fact that somebody has to run the plant. People can't be
wandering around at loose ends, each deciding what to do next. Management
decides what the employee is to do. However thi s light to direct or to initiate
5S Jordaan (refer note50 above) 141 8
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action does not imply a second-class role for the union. The union has the
right to pursue its role of representing the interest of the employee with the
same nature accorded it, as is management. To assure order, there, is a clear
procedural line drawn: the company directs and the union grieves when it
objects.
3.3. The purpose of managerial prerogative in an establishment
There are a number of reasons or purposes or why management collects personal data
on job applicants. According to the IL059, management collects personal data for the
following purposes; comply with the law, to assist in selection for employment,
training and promotion, to ensure personal safety, personal scrutiny, quality control,
customer service and the protection of property.
Strydom'" believes that in order for anorganisation to fulfill its stakeholders interests
there is need to have managerial prerogative to coordinate the skills, effort and
activities of its members so as to attain its goals. There has to be some persons, or
body of persons, within theorganisation charged with the responsibility and authority
to steer the organisation towards the attairunent of its goal by deciding on the adoption
of the best practice to attain the goal and by allocating functions and its duties to
members of the organisation and supervise those activities. Those people that have
been given the responsibility to execute their power must do so within the limits
imposed by the hierarchical structure of the organisation. Managers who act as
employer's agents mostly exercise employer's decision-making powers.
5~ ILO Code of Practice on the Protection of Workers Personal Data ILJ Vol l S Part I 1997 (2S)
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3.4 The scope of employer prerogative
It has already been stated that both the uruon and management agree that the
employer/ management has the light to manage. However there are differing
perspectives on the scope of the employer to manage.Strydom'' I has broken them
down as follows:
3.4.1 An industrial relations perspective on the scope of employer prerogative
Industrial relations is cornrnonly regarded as an amalgamation of different interest
groups such as the employees and their trade unions, shareholders and consumers,
presided over by a top management which serves the long terms needs of the
organisation by paying due concern to all these different interests'". There is an
acceptance that the employer has the decision-making power pertaining to the
economic or business component of the business such as policy issues, and the
goodwill of the organization, however the employer's prerogative regarding the
employees must be restricted. There has to be an obligation on the part of the
employer to negotiate or bargain with the trade union about matters that fall within the
'job territory' or immediate work enviromnent of empl oyee s.
Filh063 emphasizes that it is not always easy to balance the lights and interest of
employers and employees but however notice and consent may constitute important
(,) Ibid 50
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factors to be taken into consideration and may have an important influence upon the
outcome. This however does not imply that these are the only issues to be consi dered
but they merely provide us with useful information and guidelines.
It is trite to note that industrial relations authors in addition to collective bargaining
/
also regard the law as a factor that must limit or restrict the employer's prerogative.
Strydo rn'" defines employer prerogative as:
The residue of discriminatory powers of decision left to management when the
regulation impacts of law and collective bargaining have been subtracted.
Flanders65 on the other hand states that it is not only collective bargaining and the law
that restricts the employer's prerogative but also control by market forces and
accountability. Market control relates to the availability of work , which, in turn
depends mainly on the economy, Employer prerogative is at its strongest when the
economy is at its weakest, as a weak economy results in job scarcity and a large
potential workforce for employers to choose from.
3.4.2 Employers perspective on the scope of their prerogative
Bendix66 believes that a majority of employers when first confronted with trade
unions and their demands felt that their prerogative should not be restricted in any
way. To support their posi tion they adopted a unitary perspective of industrial
relations . Their arguments were that every enterpri se was an integrated and
harmonious entity that existed for a common purpose. The proponents of this view
assumed that every employee identified with the aims of the organization. They
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believed that there could be no conflict between the interests of the employers and the
employees. The employers and the employees were all striving towards the attairunent
of the organization's goals, profits and pay in which everyone in the organization had
a stake.
This unitary perspective according to Bendix67 may not be ideal to the business
particularly where there is a strong trade union representation. As a result of the
shortcomings associated with the unitary approach most employers have changed to
the pluralist view and accepted that certain aspects of the business are of importance
to the unionised employees and should therefore be made subject to collective
bargaining. Employers however were not too willing to bargain about economic
issues as they consider them to be within their exclusive prerogative. They were
however willing to bargain about labour- related issues . The change in the legislation
has however seen a change into lnore extensive forms of participation such as
negotiation, consultation, joint decision making and the topics for such participation
include ones that are regarded as falling within the business sphere of the enterprise.
3.4.3 A Labour Law perspective on the scope of employer prerogative
One of the views held by labour lawyers regarding management is that it has a
decisive say in the running of the enterprise and all business and commercial
decisions. In Checkers SA Ltd (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Commercial Catering
and Allied Workers Union6 8 the court stated that
...management has the prerogative to manage. This means asBrassey has
pointed out, management has a decisive say over the conduct of the enterprise
(,(, Bendi x S Industr ial Relations in the New South Africa (1996) 603
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and over all business commercial deci sions. Arising from this, in the second
place is management prerogative to impo se reasonable and fair disciplinary
regulation upon its workforce. Firstly management has been subjected to an
obligation to enter into negotiations with a representative union. Secondly, the
rules laid down or requirements imposed must be both fair and reasonable. But
subject to these requirements . ..management may take the initiative -and thus
exercise the 'prerogative' of laying down rules. The third area in which
managerial prerogative may come into play is the lawful ambit ofsmployccs
responsibilities. Here management's prerogative to act unilaterally is
considerably more restricted than in the other two areas.
There has been an important development in labour law in South Africa that has had
an important impact on the doctrine of managerial prerogative. The provision of
'workplace forums' in the Labour Relations Act is a significant innovation in that the
concept it embodies is completely new to our law. One has to recall that South
Afiica's legacy of repression and intensively adversarial industrial relation has
generally been seen as an obstacle to employment development. The provision for
work-place forum represents a shift from the tradition of adversarial collective
bargaining on all matters to joint problem solving and participation,
3.5 Workplace Forums
According to Summers C9 countries which have prospered both domestically and in
world competition are those that have developed institutions and attitudes that have
fostered a sense of partnership between management and employees in the running of
6X/n Checkers SA Lid (South Hills Warehouse) and SA Comm ercial Catering and Allied Workers Union ( 1990) 11 /U 1357
m (1995) ILJ Vo l 16 no4
the enterprise. Aranda" believes that 'without suitable collective protection,
individual tights are of less value'. In the South Africa such partnership iaealised
through workplace forums, The Labour Relations Act provides that an employer shall
consult with a workplace forum with a view of reaching consensus. It provides that
where an employer and the workplace forum do not reach consensus in respect of
proposals put forward, then an arbitrator should be brought in and he/she should have
the final say in such matters. The final deci sion to execute the proposal rests with
management as the employer has the authority in the form of a managerial prerogative
over the employee and also the employer, because of his stronger bargaining position
can almost unilaterally lay down terrns and conditions of service.
The employer must also disclose to the workplace forum all relevant information
(subject to some exceptions) that will allow the forum to engage effectively In
consultation and joint decision making.". Some of the matters for consultation are
listed in section 84 include among other things restructuring the workplace, including
the introduction of new technology and new methods, changes in theirganisation of
work, partial or total plant closures, mergers and transfers of ownership in so far as
they have an impact on the employees, the dismi ssal of employees for reasons based
on operational requirements, and exemption from any collective agreement or any
law. For example In Germany employers 111uSt inform Works Council,
comprehensively and in advance, of any new technical equipment that they intend to
introduce, they must provide all the necessary information that the Works Council
needs in order to exercise its tight of supervision.72
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Some matters for joint decision making are listed in section 86; they are disciplinary
codes and procedures, rules relating to the proper regulation of the workplace in so far
as they apply to conduct not related to the work performanceof employees, and
matters designed to protect and advance persons disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination. Mattes ofjoint decision making are limited to issues that have a direct
bearing on the conditions of service of employees.
The obligation to disclose information reinforces the ability of workplace forums to
demand meaningful consultation and joint decision making.I'Employers however do
not have to disclose information that is legally privileged or would cause substantial
harm to an employee or the employer, or which is private and personal to an
employee, because there is a possibility that this could lead to tension within the
workforce if privileged information were to be made known.
3.6 Conclusion
The right to manage will always exist in the employment relationship. The different
perspectives acknowledge that notwithstanding the various perspectives employees
are required to submit to the instructions of the employer. The contract of
employment forms the basis of management control and it is that basis that gives
management the authority to manage employees fairly. Consequently aslabour
relations Inoves from adversarial relationship to joint problem solving and
participation management prerogative is bound to shrink considerably. It is no longer
the whip of the employer that will take the C0111pany to a different level. It is the joint
decision making that ensures that the interestsrf all the stake holders are protected.
4 WORKPLACE DISCIPLINE
It is generally accepted that the employer has the right to maintain and enforce
discipline at the workplace. The right has its ongin In the common law, more
particularly in the contract of employment. The right to discipline is a term which is
implied by the law in the contract of employment, This term is also inextricably
linked to the employee's duty to obey all lawful and reasonable instructions. If an
employer did not have the right to discipline an employee who does not comply with
the employer's lawful and reasonable instruction, the light to give instructions would
be meaningless.
Regarding the way in which modern technology is changing Filhb4 observes that,
.. ..the way in which societies are organised becomes increasingly related to
information and communication, the use of the computer and the possibilities
provided by it, blur the frontier between private an professional worlds, so
enab ling the workplace to become a space of total disciplinary control
Consistent with the foregoing is Grogan' s" view that obedience implies discipline,
discipline implies rules and, rule s to be effective imply the power to impose sanctions
on those who do not abide by . Accordingly he perceives the power to prescribe
standards of conduct for the workplace and to initiate disciplinary steps against
transgressors as one of the most jealously guarded territories of Inanagers everywhere,
forming as it does an integral part of the broader light to manage.
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The function of discipline in the employment realm is to ensure that individual
employees contribute effectively and efficiently to the common goals of the
enterprise. Production and provision of services would be highly impeded if
employees were to be allowed to work as and how they please hence it is the
employers right and duty to ensure that the employees adhere to reasonable standards
of efficiency and conduct.
4.1 The codes guidelines in respect of the employees right to discipline
Modem labour law recognizes that the purpose of disciplinary sanctions is generally
regarded as corrective rather that punitive. The Code of Good Practice; Dismissal in
Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act endorses the concept of corrective or
progressive discipline, which regards it as a means for employees to know and
understand what standards are required of them. The Code is intended to guide
employers on the procedural and substantive requirements for a fair dismissal. It is
also intended to guide arbitrators and the labour court whether dismissal is fair.
A key principle of the Code" is that -
Employers and employees should treat one another with mutual respect. A
premium is placed on both employment justice and the efficient operation of
business. While employees should be protected from arbitrary action,
employers are entitled to satisfactory conduct and work performance for their
employees.
Employers are entitled to discipline employees in cases of misconduct or repeated
offences. This is the essence of a 'corrective' or 'progressive' approach to discipline
which aims to modify unacceptable behavior throu gh a system of graduated
disciplinary measures such as coun seling and warnings.
The Code recognizes that for dismissal to be fair it has to be in compliance with the
issues of substantive and procedural fairness as captured in items 4 and 7 of schedule
8. The substantive aspects invol ve contravention of a rule by the employee whilst
procedural aspects involve following of clear procedures by the employer.
In any employment relationship some degree of surveillance and of processing
personal data is necessary not only for disciplinary but also for day to day
management, An employer may need to process a variety of personal data about the
employee' " such as information in order to assess and individual 's suitability for a
given job. An employer may also be obli ged to pos sess private information about
regarding their pension allocation in case of death.
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5 WORKPLACE DISCIPLINE AND TELEPHONE ABUSE
An employer's main goal is to ensure that he/she runs a sustainable and profitable
organization. It is therefore of paramount importance that employees abide by the rule
failing which appropriate action will be taken against them. Employers may engage in
a number of ways to ensure compliance with its rules and regulation and SOlTIe of
these ways might involve monitoring and interception of telephone communication .
5.1 The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992
The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 (IMP Act) 7~urpose is
to prohibit the interception and monitoring of telephone conversation or the
interception and opening of postal articles unless a detailed prior procedure has been
followed.". It states its purpose as follows:
[to] prohibit the interception of certain communication and the monitoring of
certain conversations or communication; to provide for the interception of
postal articles and communications and for the monitoring of conversations or
communication in the case of a serious offence of if the security of the
Republic is threatened.
Section 2 of the IMP Act provides as follows ;
(1)No person shall-
(a) Intentionally and without the knowledge or permission of the
dispatcher intercept a communication which has been or is intended to
n Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992
be transmitted by telephone or In any other Inann er over a
telecommunication line; or;
(b) Intentionally monitor any conversation or communication by means of
a monitoring device so as to gather confidential information
concerning any person, body or organization
A number of definitions in this section are relevant in the interpretation on this wide
and general interpretation
A 'telecommunication line' is extremely widely defined to include
any apparatus, instrument, pole, mast, wire, pipe, pneumatic, or other tube,
thing means which is or may be used for or in connection with the sending,
conveying or transmitting or receiving of signs, signals, sounds,
communication or other intormatiori''
This definition is sufficiently wide to include the electronic equipment, linking and
distribution systems that serve to connect computers to one another.
A 'monitoring device' is defined is defined as
[A]ny instrument, device or equipment which is used or can be used, whether
by itself or in combination with any other instrument, device or equipment, to
listen to or record any conversation or comrnunicatiori"
Mischke.82 also states that this definition is wide enough to encompass not only tape
recorders, but also other electronic equipment that can be used to record a
79 See the US electronic Communication Pri vacy Act (ECPA) which prohibits the interception and
monitoring of electronic communication




conversation or communication, for example a computer can be used to store
electronic mail messages. He maintains that the prohibition contained in section 2(1)
of IMP Act relates to 'no person' and that the term is not defined in any manner and
can therefore be given its ordinary meaning to include, therefore, an employee
(whether a natural or juristic person) or a representative of the employee.
Permission to monitor can be given by a judge, who must be convinced that a serious
offence has been or is being or will be committed and cannot be investigated in any
other manner.
Van Dokkuln83 states that it is doubtful that this Act was ever intended to be used in
the civil litigation context. Section 3 (2) of theIMPAct provides that any application
to a judge for a directive shall be made by a police officer, or an army officer, or to a
member of the intelligence service. H~4 further states that it would seem to be a clear
indication that the IMPAct was intended to be used by only the police or the military,
including the intelligence services and is not concerned with the interception or
monitoring in the private sphere but is rather concerned with the gathering of
evidence by public agencies during the investigation of a crime.
5.2 Admissibility of telephone recordings
There have been a number of cases before the South Afiican courts on the application
of section 2 of the IMPAct. The cases relates to admissibility of evidence gathered
through an unauthorized interception and monitoring of telephone conversation.
X3 Van Dokkum N; Class note s 2002, at 200
X4 Ibid at 200
4.)
In Goosen v Caroline Frozen Yoghurt Parlour85 (decided under the interim
constitution) on the admissibility of illegally obtained recordings the court held that
illegally obtained tape recordings wereinfact admissible. The court's concern was not
how the tapes were obtained but rather on whether the recordings were relevant to the
matters at hand. The court quoted Hoffinan and'Zcffert The SA Law of Evidence at
that:
the general rule stated by Lord Goddard when giving the evidence of the
judicial Committee inKurl71a v R:
in their Lordships' opinion, the test to be applied in considering
whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matter in
issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how
the evidence was observed.
Only if evidence was obtained under duress or is self incriminatory would the cOUli
not admit such evidence. It must be mentioned however that broad reading on the
question of admissibility is that admissibility of evidence is in principle determined
with reference to its relevance. In determining relevance reference must be made to
the potential weight of the evidence. The court also accepted that there would be
instances where it would be ideal to apply the Bill of Rights horizontally.
The decision ofProtea Technology Ltd and Another v Wainer and Others 86 related to
an alleged infringement of a restraint of trade agreement. The employer in support of
its case had included transcripts of tape recordings of telephone conversations made
by the employee whilst still in the employment of the employer. The conversation
indicated that the employee was in a breach of the employment contract on the
XS Coosen \' Caroline Frozen Yoghurt Parl our (1995) 16 IU 296 (le)
xC> Prot ea Technology Ltd and Another \' Wainer and Oth ers 1997 (9) BCLR 1225 (\V ) AT 1237 D-E
restraint of trade. The recordings had been made clandestinely. The respondent argued
that the evidence was inadmissible because it had been obtained in contravention of
the IMPAct.
The court considered whether the employers actions constituted breach of privacy and
found that the right to privacy can be limited and that the individual must have formed
a subjective expectation of privacy and also that society mustecognise expectation as
reasonable. The court in its consideration of the right to privacy considered that the
telephone calls were made during company time from the employer's premises. The
employer therefore cannot be said to have breached the right to privacy since an
employer has a right to know what an employer does during working hours. It held
that Wainer was not entitled to insist upon the protection of the constitutional right to
privacy and that the court can exercise its discretion to admit illegally obtained
evidence which was reasonable in an open and democratic society.
In the case of Allied Workers Union of SA on behalf of Ncube v Northern Crime
Security CC7 the employee was dismissed after a disciplinary enquiry for using
threatening and abusive language to a manager. Some of the conversations had been
tape-recorded. The employees union objected to the admissibility of the recordings in
evidence. The Commissioner however found that the recordings were not made in
contravention of section 2 (1) of the IMPAct in that they were recordings of
conversations directly between the employee and the manager, and so were not
interceptions' in the sense intended by the Act. Also the intention of monitoring the
calls was not to gather confidential information about the employee but rather to
verify the threats that he was alleged to have made, The Commissioner maintained
X7AIlied Workers Union ofSA on behalfof Nc ube \' Northern Crime Security CC (1999) 20 ILl 1954 (CC MA )
that he is entitled to exercise his discretion as to whether or not to accept such
evidence in civil proceedings.
In the decision ofMkhize and Bayh ead Cold Storage88 the employer suffered losses of
R20 000.00. After trying different types of surveillance such as cameras and
undercover agents without any success the employer resorted to using the services of
a risk management and surveillance camera as a way of apprehending the culprits.
Monitoring of telephones included monitoring of a public telephone, which was
situated in the premises of the employer. The public telephone recordings revealed
some theft taking place by one of the employees who was subsequently dismissed
following a disciplinary hearing in which the tape recordings were used as evidence.
The employee challenged the admissibility of the evidence claiming that it
contravened section 14 of the Constitution. The Commissioner however held that the
evidence was admissible.
There is an element of discretion in the admissibility of evidence acquired in
contravention of the IMPAct , as evidenced by a South African Airways arbitration
award in which the arbitrator exerci sed his discretion not to admit relevant evidence
acquired in contravention of the IMPAct. He maintains that the reason for the
arbitrator exercising his discretion against admitting the evidence included the fact
that the employer had no evidence to justify the monitoring and that the employer
acted on a mere suspicion of drug trafficking The company also failed to obtain legal
advice on the operation and application of theIMPAct and that no legal alternatives to
the monitoring of telephone conversation were considered and hence it would be
wrong to condone the actions on the elnployer(SAA) and its flagrant disregard to the
law by admitting evidence which was obtained illegally without even considering
alternative methods of obtaining the evidence. 89
The different decisions on the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence indicates
that the courts can exercise its discretion when deciding whether or not to admit the
evidence.
5.3 Common law and admissibility of illegally obtained evidence
The common law has been modified to enable a court to exercise flexibility consistent
with justice. It assumes that all evidence however obtained is admissible subject to the
court's discretion to exclude it. This is however in contravention with the
Constitution. In Protea Technology Ltd and Another v Wainer and others90 the
Court's position was that if the common law is at odds with the Constitution the
courts must, if that can realistically be done, develop the common law in such a
manner as to promote the spirit , purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Such
development requires the test of admissibility to be formulated differently; any
evidence which depends upon the breach of a fundamental Constitutional right can
only be admitted if the admission of the evidence is justifiable by the standards laid
down in section 36( 1) of the Constitution. There has to be a balancing of lights. The
interest of uncovering must be along the need to ensure that constitutional lights are
not negated or obscured. Privacy is not an absolute right under the Constitution nor
could it be in practice.
~X Mkhi:e and Bayhead Cold Storage Unreported CCMA award
X9 Ibid , 96
90 Protea Technology Ltd and Another v Wainer and others (refer 86 above)
The courts should retain the discretion to admit evidence, which was relevant,
provided that any fundamental tight involved were given its proper weight In
determining how to exercise that discretion.
5.4 Constitutional right to privacy and monitoring
Section 14(d) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the light to pnvacy,
which includ es the tight not to have the privacy of their communication infringed.
In Moonsamy v The Mailhouse91 the Commissioner found that tape recordings
recorded by way of interception, listening and recording device that was connected to
the employee's telephone in his office at the premises of the employer was clearly an
invasion of privacy and therefore an invasion of the employees lights in terms of
section 14 (d) of the Constitution. The Commissioner however made the following
observation:-
It is extremely difficult to clarify, at least with any degree of precision, the
nature of the tight to privacy of an employee on the premises of the employer
during working hours. In Katz v US92 the U.S Supreme Court held that the
individual is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonable
expectation could only exist when the individual had a subjective expectation
of privacy and secondly, the society must recognize the expectation as
reasonable. Within the context of the emplo yment relationship, the second
requi rement is largely determin ed by the 'operational realities of the
workp lace' . In 0 'Connor v Ortega93 480 the same Court found that the
operational realities of the workplace may lnak e SOlne employees expectation
9IM oolls a11lY v The Mailhouse (1999) 20 IV 464 (CCMA)
92 Kat: v US 389 US 347 (1967)
9.' 0 'Connor \' Ortega 480 US 709 (1987)
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of privacy unreasonable, which might be found to be reasonable in other non -
employment contexts.
The Commissioner then considered whether the infringement could be justified in
accordance with section 36 of the Constitution. He observed that the light to privacy
in our Bill of Rights was similar to section 8 of the Canadian Charter which reads as
follows; 'Everyone has the light to be secure against unreasonable searches or
seizure'. The Commissioner's decision that there was an invasion of privacy relied in
the decision ofHunter v Southam Inc 94 whereby the Supreme Court of Canada held
that section 8 was aimed at protecting, at the very least, the individuals light to
privacy, which was 'the light to be secure against encroachment upon the citizen's
reasonable expectation in a free and democratic society. It was held in thcHunter v
Southam Inc that this purpose required a means of preventing unjustified searches
before they happen, and not of determining, after the facts, whether they ought to
have occurred in the first place. That could only be accomplished by a system of prior
rather than subsequent authorization. The Commissioner therefore felt that privacy
clause should be interpreted to similar effect, given the similarity between it and its
Canadian counterpart.
In the decision ofMkhize and Bayhead Cold Storage.,,95 the Commissioner when
dealing with the issue ofprivacy held that:
With regard to ....a public phone on the employees premises - the matter is
more complex because there is expectation of privacy when using a public
telephone ....a balancing is required between the expectation of the user of the
telephone that the call will be private and, on the other hand, the
reasonableness of that expectation in the light of the public interest.
l)~ Hunter I' Soutltani Inc 11 DLR (4th) 641, 652-3
9) Mkhi:e and Bayhead Cold Storage (Refer 88) above
5.5 Waiving of rights
The Employment contract implies that an employee is entitled to basic privacy and
dignity but nevertheless there are no laws which prevent an employee agreeing as a
condition of employment to being searched and monitored. The general principle is to
have this explicitly stated in the contract of employment, In agreeing to searches,
monitoring or surveillance an employee is expressly waiving certain privacy lights.
Van Dokkuln96 states that in the absence of an express term, it is difficult to imply
that there is agreement by the employee to be searched or monitored simply because it
is an implied term that an employee will not steal from the employer. He maintains
that an exception to this general principle would be in instances where there was no
legitimate expectation of privacy and that legitimacy depends ultimately on the public
norms at the time, or the basic norm of the industry concerned such as a diamond
manufacturing company where employees are constantly monitored and subjected to
spot searches. Absence of an explicit clause in the contract of employment waiving
certain privacy light can be regarded as unconstitutional or lawful unless it is clear
that the nature of the job is such that there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy
on the part of the employee.
McQuoid Mason" states that the mere fact that the parties on a telephone are aware
that they must be careful when talking on the telephone cannot be construed as
consent to the violation, or waiver or the person 's expectation of the light to privacy,
96 Class notes 2002
97 Mc Quoid - Mason 0 in Constitutional Law or South Africa Revision- Service 3 1998 18-1 7
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5.6 Issue of company property
There is no dispute that the telephone at the employer's premises belongs to the
employer. However if the employer permits ernployees to utilize his property
(telephone) to make private conversation then this may create an expectation on the
part on the part of the employee that those conversations are private.
In the decis ion of the European Court of Human Rightsflaford v United Kingdom98
it was held that the employee enjoyed privacy with regard to her office and the
telephone line in her office because she was given permission to engage in matters
unrelated to her work while in her own office."
In the decision of Moonsamy v The MailhouseJOO the Commissioner stated that it is
arguable that even though telephone conversation took place on the employer's
telephone (as regards ownership) an employee however expected a certain degree of
privacy. Based on that the Commissioner held that there was invasion of privacy by
the employer
In the decision of Warren Thomas Griffiths Union v VTiVSA 101 the applicant was
dismissed for willful disobedience relating to the abuse of the company property;
namely the telephone. The company had found out that the applicant had excessively
used the company telephone to telephone his girlfriend in Cape Town. The applicant
was advised to make his telephone calls within reason and keep costs them at an
acceptable level. The applicant did not adhere to the issue of telephone rules but
instead he started making his telephone calls from other employees' extensions. The
9X Haford v United Kingdom (1997) IRLR 47 (ECHR)
'!9 Craig J. DR.; Privacy and Employment Law 1999;17
applicant's defense was that the company had no telephone policy and therefore he
had no indication of what could be regarded as an acceptable level. The company had
decided to dismiss him after there was no significant decrease in the usages of the
company telephone. The Commissioner held that the dismissal was fair in that the
applicant had been warned not to abuse the company property and that regardless of
the fact that there was no policy the amount of time and money spent on the phone
was totally unacceptable.
In another arbitration award ofAntonette Dorfling Union v Precision Sharpening
Services CCl02- the applicant was dismissed after a third and final warning on the
abuse of the company telephone. The respondent's position was that the applicant
continued to abuse the company telephone even after the final warning and in addition
the applicant's performance was greatly affected. The Commissioner held that the
applicant's dismissal was substantively fair but procedurally unfair since the
respondent did not follow the right procedure.
Craig l03 states that privacy is a personal light as opposed to a light in property and
therefore can be premised on an individual's expectation of privacy, hence it is
possible for an employee to have a private interest of a territorial nature within a place
in which he possesses no property light. He states that telephone calls may only be
monitored to the extent necessary to guard against authorized use of the telephone or
to determine the nature of the call but once it is ascertained that the call is personal the
employer must cease the monitoring.
100 Moonsamy v Mailhouse (refer 91 above)
101Warren 77IOI1lGS Griffiths Union v VWSA unpublished CCMA case no KN EC 161 74
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5.7 Issue of company time
An employer has interest in knowing what an employee does during working time due
to the nature of the employment relationship. An employer is entitled to request an
employee to account for his actions during working hours since an employer expects
lUOSt of the time to be dedicated towards advancing the interests of the employer and
not the employee's. An employer may not compel an employee to disclose the nature
of private calls made.
In Protea Technology Ltd and Another v Wainer and Others' Y" the Court held that an
employer could expect the employee to account for his or her activities during the
employer's time. The Court stated as follows;
The content of conversation involving the employer's affairs (whether directly
or indirectly) is a different matter. The employer is entitled to demand and
obtain from an employee as full an account as the latter is capable of
furnishing. In this sense also, the company can fairly be regarded as the owner
of the knowledge in the employee's mind.
In the saIueProteal 05 decision the Commissioner held that
In reality it is extremely difficult to clarify with any decision of precision, the
nature of the light to privacy of an employee on the premises of the employer
during working hours.
: ~~ Ant~nelte DO/fling Union v Precision Sharp ening Services CC unpublished CCMA case no KN 15866
. Craig Irefcr note 101 above) 32
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In an unpublished decision ofFran ces Hasessan Jones v Eccles Associates't" the
applicant was dismissed after being warned to stop spending too much time on the
telephone talking to her family. The amount of time spent on the phone affected the
applicant's performance. The applicant conceded that the amount of titne she spent on
the phone indeed affected her work. Numerous counseling sessions were held to try
and assist the applicant, but all in vain. The respondent then finally dismissed the
applicant. The Commissioner decided that the applicant had been fairly dismissed
since the applicant did not reduce time on the telephone discussing personal matters
during company time.
5.8 Issue of loyalty and honesty
An employer as stated earlier has a contractual tight to know the activities of the
employee during working hours. An employer therefore expects an employee to
conduct himself in a loyal and faithful manner in executing his functions. In
Moonsamy v The Mailhouse l 07 the Commissioner stated that for this reason alone, and
due to the exigencies of the workplace it is clear that the employee's tight to privacy
at least regarding work related matters lTIUSt be qualified..However the fundamental
issues are how, when and to what extent this privacy should be restricted or limited.
In Warren Thomas GrifJiths Union v VT¥SA108 the applicant demonstrated dishonesty
by using other peoples telephone after being warned to reduce the amount of time he
spent on the telephone. The employer felt that he had lost bust and faith in the
applicant which made the employment relationship difficult.
106Frallces Hasessan Jones I' Eccles Associates Case No not stated
107Moonsamy v The Mailhouse (refer note 9 1 above)
5.9 Conclusion
It is not controversial that people spend a lot of their time at the workplace and hence
there is an overlap between private matters and the employer's working time. The
cases referred to however indicate that employer's may not monitor employee's
telephone conversations without a reason. In those situations where the employer had
to monitor the telecommunications this was normally after an employer had felt that
there was a need to monitor the telecommunications, The right to privacy requires that
an individual must have formed a subjective expectation of privacy and secondly
society must recognise the light as reasonable. There is also evidence that the
discretion to admit illegally obtained evidence will always rest with the court but also
the discretion must be exercised with regard to the substance of sec 36( 1) giving due
weight to the need to protect the right which has been breached, policy considerations
and the boni mores of the community.
IO~ Warren Thomas Griffiths Union \' VWSA (Refe r note I03 above)
6. WORKPLACE DISCIPLINE AND INTERNET ABUSE
There are a nUluber of employment issues that mise out of the use of the computer at
the workplace. Employers find themselves faced with the challenge of potential
liability for intemet abuse against the employees light to privacy. Lack of proper
monitoring of the usage of the intcmet and e-mail by employer may result in lost
productivity, degradation of available computing resources and the risk of legal
liability. The employer is also faced with the challenge of the degree in which an
employee communication may be monitored given the fact that the computer is the
property of the employer. An intemet User Policy if adopted by the company may
assist the control of the use of the computers as well as the sanctions that may be
imposed on the employees for the abuse.
Aranda'l" believes that it true that an employer has always had power over employees
but compared to traditional monitoring , computer monitoring represents a quantum
leap. He states as follows;
We faced with a monitoring that is distant, cold, incisive, constant,
surreptitious, and apparently infallible. Never have employers been able to
monitor so much and for so long.
6.1 An Internet User Policy
Employers should have an intemet user policy which will regulate the use of the
intemet. The policy must provide for an acknowledgement by the employeehat the
company's intemet system is neither confidential nor private and may be monitored.
109
Aranda .l T ;Colllparative Labour Law & Policy Journal: Information Technology and Workers Privacy; Workers' Privacy:
The Spanish Law Vol 23' No2 Winter 2002, 422
The contents of such communication may also be assessed by the company and its
employees froIn time to time for legitimate and lawful business activities. Some of
the issues that should be monitored in an internet user policy include prohibition
against using the facilities for activities unrelated to the general activities of the
company such as the transmission of obscene or threatening material, the
transmission ofunauthorised distribution of company data and information, removing
hardware or software belonging to the film from the premises without prior written
approval, disseminating confidential information and downloading software without
reasonable virus protection. Adoption of office policy will set out the rights and
obligations of the employer as well as what is expected of the employees and the
disciplinary action that can be taken in case of non compliance.
Johnsorr" states that although the contents of an intemet user policy will vary
according to the individual needs of each business the following provisions will be
commonplace:
(i)Rules relating to obscenity, profanity and defamatory language
(ii)Infonning employees about the employer's potential liability fortheir
electronic communication
(iii)Rules with respect to record retention as well as what information is to be
gathered and stored
(iv)Reasonable guidelines in the scope ofmonitoring; and
(v)Rules relating to the use of the intemet and e-mai l facilities at the office
6.2 Employee Privacy and the Internet Usage
The Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provisions of Communication-
related Information Act 11 came into operation on 30 December 2002 and has
provoked a debate whether an employer is permitted to monitor his employees use of
his e-mail and Internet facilities. Section 2 of the Act contains a general prohibition
from intentionally intercepting or attempting to intercept any communication if one of
the parties to the communication has not given prior consent in writing to such
interception. This section read with section 2, therefore provides that a third party is
prohibited from intercepting, monitoring or recording e-mail and intcrnet abuse (both
the content as well as the destination address), without the written consent of one of
the parties to the communicatiori 12. It would seem that one of the way in which
employers can meet these legal requirements is for written consent to be obtained at
tilne of entering into the contract of employment.
Section 6 deals specifically with employee e-mail and intemct usage. It states that any
"person may, in the course of the carrying of any business, intercept any indirect
communication (a) by means of which a transaction is entered into in the course of
that business; (b) which otherwise relates to that business, in the course of its
transmission over a telecommunication system". A direct communication is defined to
include oral communication. An "indirect communication" means the transfer of
information, including a message or any part of a message, whether (a) in the form of
(i) speech, music or other sound s, (ii)data, (iii) text , (iv)visual images, whether
110 .Iohnson.l De Rebus, Nov 2002 ;55
I11 TIle Regulation oflnterception of Communica tion and Prov isions of Communication- relat ed Information Act 70 of2002
112 See a lso English Law on Regulation ofInvestigatory Powe rs Ac t 2000 Sect I which in principle states that interception on
publi c and private systems will not be lawful unless both inter locutors have consented.
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animated or not,(v) signals; or (vi) radio frequency spectrum; or (b) in any other form
or in any combination of forms, that is transmitted in whole or in part by means of a
postal service or by a telecommunication service, which in turn includes the intemet.
A person may only intercept an indirect communication: (a) if the interception is
effected by, or with the express or implied consent of, the "system controller" that is
the CEO or an equivalent officer or any person dulyauthorised by that officer; (b) for
purpose of monitoring or keeping a record of indirect communication aa) in order to
establish the existence of facts; (bb) for purposes of investigating or detecting the
unauthorised use of that telecommunication system; (cc) where that is undertaken in
order to secure, or as an inherent part of, the effective operation of the system; (c) if
the telecommunication system concerned is provided for use wholly or partly in
connection with that business; and (d) if the CEO has made all reasonable efforts to
inform in advance a person who intends to use the telecommunication system
concern, that indirect communications transmitted by means thereof may be
intercepted or if such indirect communication is intercepted with the express or
implied consent of the person who uses that telecommunication system.
It may be argued that this section does not deal with the situation where an employer,
who suspects an employee of downloading pornography onto the employer's business
computer, accesses the employee's computer and then discovers such content on the
computers' hard disk. The section ilTIpOSeS conditions that lTIUSt be complied with
before interception, monitoring or recording can be done, of which the most important
is that the CEO must have warned the employees that their e-mail and internet usage
will and/or can be monitored to ensure that they do not abuse the employer's e-mail
and intemet policy or the employees prior written consent must have been obtained.
The employees implied consent will have been obtained where the employee has to
'accept' certain terms and conditions before he is permitted to use his employer's
internet facilities
It seems section 2 and 5 regulate general interceptions, monitoring and recordings of
e-mail and internet usage whilst sec 6 regulates specific interceptions monitoring and
recordings. A consequence of this is that an employer may intercept, monitor or
record e-mail and internet usage in transit, which refers to both the content of the
communication as well as the web site address or e-mail address which the employee
uses either for sending or retrieving information, provided that the above requirements
of sec 6 are complied with.
When the communication reaches the intended receipt, sec 6 no longer playsny role
in that the communication is no longer "in transit". It can be argued that where an
employee returns to his office after working hours , say for example on a Sunday to
use his employer's internet or e-mail facilities or e-mail facilities for conduct contrary
to the e-mail or internet policy, sec 6 does not govern the scenario in that he did use
these facilities during the course of business. Sec 2 and 5 will govern this situation
and therefore the employees writt en consent is required.
6.3 Reasons for monitoring the internet
There are a number of reasons why an employer may wish to monitor thenterne t,
some of the reasons are discussed below.
6.3.1 Company time
An employer expects employees to carry out the company's business during working
time after all that is the basis of the emplo yment relationship. An employee who
spends most of his time surfing the net instead of carrying out the company's business
stands to be disciplined for misusing the employer's time whilst being paid for tP. In
the decision ofBamfoI'd & Others/ Energizer (SA) Lti 14 employees were dismissed
after being charged for abuse of the e-mail. The employer sent out an e-mail
instructing all employees to refrain from on-sending ludicrous chain e-mails on
company system and company tim e. The employees however ignored the instruction
and were subsequently dismissed for abusing company time, The Commissioner ruled
that the dismissal was substantive1y and procedurally fair.
Paterson 115 however states that on the other hand the opportunity for some personal
use of the internet may in fact enhance an emplo yee 's skills in the effective use of the
electronic medium and reduce the amount of time required for personal, face to face
transaction. She maintains that a more logical approach is to monitor employees'
productive output rather than their electronic transaction and to confine surveillance
to situations where there is reason to believe that this may be implicated in a low or
reduced level of productivity .
113 A 1999 survey indicated that a third of employees spen d tim e surfing the Net whi le at work; another survey that year found
that the number of at work visitors to financia l web sites increased 37 perce nt (from 5.95 million to 8.15 million) from December
to March 1999. See Finkin M Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal; Informati on Technology and Workers Privacy; The
United States Law Vo! 23 No2 Winte r 2002,474
114 Bamford & Others/ Energizer (SA) Lld (2001) 12 BA LR 1251
6.3.2 Clogging the corporate network
The internet is the property of the employer and hence should be used as such. Each
time an employee uses the internet for a private purpose he or she should know that it
he or she is taking up the employer's space on the bandwidth intended for business.
For example when one sends an e-mail it goes from the personal computer onto the
mail server and then goes into the world wide web until it reaches the mail recipient.
The problem is that the medium conveying messages to and on thevorld wide web
has limited space or bandwidth and can get clogged or backed up due to over
subscription. If the caniage medium gets clogged because all the space has been taken
up then all the information that is transmitted has to wait in line until there is some
space. This therefore means the employer business gets slowed down due to the
competition ofprivate business of conducted by employees during working hours .
In the decision of Bamford & Others/ Energiser SA ua'" the employees were
dismissed after the employer found that there was a great deal of internet abuse . There
was a complaint by some employees that their computer system was inefficient. An
audit was carried out which revealed that some of the complainants spend a great deal
of time sending out chain letters and pornographic material. It was also foundiut that
there was a volume of material running into thousands of communication which had
nothing to do with work since most of it was pornographic in nature. Clogging the
company's network results in blockage of access andusing computer power needed
for corporate activities . The Commissioner stated that objectively speaking the
trafficking in chain mail and trafficking in chain mail and in pornography was
damaging to the business of the respondents and that the most obvious damage was in
clogging up the system and running up costs.
115 Paterson M University of Tasmania: Law Review Vol 2 1 No I 2002; I(2)
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Paterson 11 7 however believes that there is a way to addressing clogging of the
network. He believes that it would make more sense to tackle the issue of congestion
specifically such as identification of peak periods and to request employees to confine
their activities to those that are strictly necessary. Another way would be through
imposition of technological constraints like limiting the size of attachments that
employees could receive. Patersonl 18 however points out that surveillance could be
justifiable in situations where an employee isutilising large volumes of bandwidth
during peak times or where their overall intemet usage is unusually larger compared
to that of their eo-workers.
6.3.3 Expressly prohibited use
In South Africa the Provisions of the Films and Publication Act l 19 prohibits the
distribution of child pornography, explicit violent sexual conduct bestiality, explicit
sexual conduct which degrades a person and which conducts incitement to cause harm
or explicit infliction of extreme violence. The viewing of sexually explicit material in
the workplace has a direct impact on fellow employees who are often offended by this
material . Employees who therefore engage in viewing sexually prohibited material
may be disciplined for viewing material that has been expressly prohibited.
6.3.4 Gender and Racial Issues
If an employee engages in sending material which has gender or racial or sensitive
contents it may have serious implications for both the company and the employee
who sent the mail. Johnson states that an American Company, Chevron, recently paid
116 Bamford & Others/ Energiser SA Ltd (refer note 11 5 above)
117 Patcrson (refer note 117 above) 3
ll X Ibid, 3
119 South Africa the Provisions of the Films and Publication Act 65 of 1996
$ 2.2 million in settlement of a sexual harassment claim after an employee posted '25
reasons why beer is better than womeri 'on the company 's bulletin board to which a
female employee took exception.
J ; . 120 1 dismi d 1 f .In Cronje v Toyota Manufacturing an emp oyee was isrmsse as a resu t 0 a racist
cartoon distributed at the workplace. The applicant received an e-mail which he
printed out to other colleagues at a meeting. The e-mail consisted of a cartoon
depicting an adult and a young gorilla, both with the head of PresidenMugabe of
Zimbabwe superimposed on them. The caption stated 'we want to grow lnore
bananas' . He defended himself by stating that he did not regard the cartoon as racist
but rather as a depiction of Zimbabwe as a banana republic. The human resources
manager deposed that the respondent's intemet and e-mail usage code specifically
outlawed the display and or transmission of any offensive racial, sexual, religious or
political images documents on any company system. The factory employed 3500
blacks and 1000 whites, and race related issues were very important on the factory
floor. Black employees were upset by the cartoon. The Commissioner found that it
was reasonable to include a rule prohibiting the distribution of racist and
inflammatory or offensive material in the company's code. The applicant was aware
of the rule which was consistently applied. The Commissioner found the dismissal to
be fair.
6.3.5 Vicarious Liability
According to Mischke121 it is a principle of our common law that an employer may be
held jointly and severely liable with an employee for an employee's wrongful acts
110 Crouje v Tovota Manufacturing (2001)22 ILl 735 (CCMA)
121 Mischke ( refer note 88 above) 46
committed in the course and within the scope of the employees' duties . The issue is
clearly captured by Rycroft' <' when he states as follows:
The employer may not be able to escape liability merely because the act was
intentional, amounted to criminal conduct or was specifically prohibited by the
employer.
Paterson 123 states that activities that may create legal liability include the downloading
or distribution of copyright material, the posting of defamatory material on bulletin
boards, the circulation of defamatory material on bulletin boards. To substantiate his
position he refer to a case in which a Chevron Corporation that paid out $2.l2Inillion
to settle a sexual harassment case brought by female employees as a result of an emai l
titled 'why beer is better than women'.
An employer stands to be held liable for wrongful activities committed by
employees'<' intemet and network related acts committed by the employee regardless
of the fact that an employer had specifically prohibited those acts. An issue that begs
to be dealt with is whether an employee acted within the scope of his or her duties.
Bassonl 25 states the following as issues that should be considered in order to
constitute employer's liability;
a) there must be a contract of service between the employee and the employer at the
time the employee canies out an unlawful act
b) the conduct of the employee must have been unlawful; that is the requirements for
a delict must be meet
c) the employee must have acted in the course and scope of the employees duties or
service. An issue that always pose a challenge in its conviction
122 Rycrofl & Jordan A Guide to SA Labour Law2 cd ( 1992) 86
m Paterson M (refer note 115 above) 4
It is therefore imperative that an employer ensures that employees do not engage in
activities that may result in vicarious liability through company codes and procedures.
6.3.6 Performance Monitoring
According to Paterson126 surveillance of usage of the e-mail and internet usage serves
the purpose of monitoring performance as well as enhancing productivity. She states
that such commonly used softwareprogramme will not only monitor the usage of the
intemet and e-mail but also has the ability to record every strokeprogramme used
and file opened or copied and to incorporate such information into a searchable report.
6.3.7 Property of the employer
There is no question that in an employment relationship the computer would be the
property of the employer. The employer may therefore wish to monitor the internet
use such as the size of the message, attachments, the frequency and volume of e-mail
sent by an employee, web-sites often visited by the employee and the frequency of
hits of those. The regulation of Interception of Communication related Information
Act as already mentioned clearly states that there is a general prohibition from
intercepting, monitoring or recording e-mail and intemet abuse (both the content and
the destination) without the written consent of one of the parties to the
communication.
An employee would be allow ed to make use of the company property to conduct his
own personal business but the employer by virtue of the fact that he owns the property
would want to make sure that his property is not abused but rather isrtiliscd to the
124 St Q Skee n A Criminal Law LA IVSA vol6 ( 1996) 378
125 Basson et al Essential Labour Law (vo l l) Individua l Labou r Law ( 1998) 50
benefit of the company. It is however imperative that an employer seeks consent of
the employees before he/she can introduce monitoring of such communication.
6.3.8 Personal use
Working people spend a great deal of their working time at the workplace. They
therefore expect some kind of privacy at the workplace even though they areitilising
the company's property. The big challenge is to what extent can an employer permit
personal use (that is non-company related use) of e-mail facilities and other
communication facilities by its employees. Buys 127 states that there are those who
hold the view that if all personal use is totally prohibited them no employee would
have any possible expectation in any stored material (for example computer or
e-mail) . He however believes that the better practice is to permit restricted personal
use of e-mail either internally or externally and then incorporate other policies such as
privacy expectation, misuse of company resources around this pragmatic
acknowledgement. Personal use should entail some articulated constraints on such
use. It should not be allowed to consume a significant amount of theemployees
workday.
6.4 Concl usion
Computers, computer network have become inextricably linked to our day to day
working activities. The employees would have to exerci se caution in how they wism
exercise their light to privacy. Failure to observe the employer's policy would result
in disciplinary action. It would appear that in a situation where an employee
disregards the company's policy then the employees cannot state that the light to
l2(, Paterson M (refer note 11 5 above)1
127 Buys R; The Law of the Internet in South Africa; (200) at 197
privacy has been infiinged since there is no light that is absolute. The employer on
the other side would be advised to seek appropriate professional advice an introduce a
well drafted internet user policy which reflects the values of the employer, protects
the employer's legitimate proprietary interests and respects the reasonable and
legitimate expectation of employees to privacy.
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7 WORKPLACE DISCIPLINE AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The rise of electronic surveillance is a new concept that is gaining momentum as a
result of modem technology in the business circles. For example there is no need to
serve a customer over the counter, emphasis is now on self service and only seeking
shop attendant's assistance when making payment. It is however imperatives to notify
employee why there has to be introduction before embarking in the exercise.
Vigneax'r" states that most national and international norms on workplace
surveillance or data processing specifically require the prior notification of the
subject; without it these norms deem any such actions to be unlawfJ¥9.
Selnpill 130 believes that the issue of workplace surveillance as an issue of public
concern is partly because of its centrality in industrial disputes. He states that in New
South Wales, a series of disputes betweenFrankins, a major grocery retailer and the
National Union of Workers (NUW), briefly pushed the issue into the print media.
The result of that was consideration in the legislative agenda which resulted in
NSW'S Workplace Video Surveillance Act 131 - The first and only workplace -
specific, electronic Surveillance legi slation in Australia.
He maintains that electronic workplace surveillance usually involves private
employees who use their superior position to intrude upon and control employees. He
believes that workplace surveill ance is simply a new albeit particularly offensive,
method of enforcing the employer's legal li ght to secure obedience.
12X Vigneax Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journ al; Information Technology and Workers Privacy; Workers' Privacy:
Regulatory Techniques Vol 23' N02 Winter 2002, 512
129 See for example Art icle L. 121-8 of the French Labour Law Code
noJ Sempill ' Under the Lens: Electronic Workplace Surveillance (2001) 14 Australian Joumal of Labour Law. 1I 1,11 3
1.'1 NSW'S Workplace Video Surveillance Act 1998
According to Vigneax132 the balance of rights requires a balance to be set between
two opposing rights: on the one hand the right of employers to check on the work that
is being done for them by their employees and, on the other, the right to the
employees to SOIne degree of privacy as clearly spelt out in Article 20.3 of the
Workers' Statute in Spain, in which an employer may:
[A]dopt the measures of surveillance and control that he sees fit in order to
ensure that workers fulfil their contractual obligations and duties, paying due
respect in the adoption and implementation of such measures to the human
dignity of the workers.
7.1 The implied duty of mutual trust and confidence.
According to Sernpill'" in England there is an implied term In all contract of
employment to the effect that an employer will not without reasonable and proper
cause conduct itself in a manner calculated and likely to destroy or seriously damage
the relationship of confidence and bust between an employer and an employee He
states that the application - of the implied duty to aspect of employment law involves
difficult questions of fact and degree and the issue of workplace surveillance is no
exception.
He states that Mcf.allum and McCurry suggest that the implied duty of bust and
confidence might limit 'convert observation of changing rooms. They gave a
hypothetical scenario whereby a strong case might be made against a male employer
who for an improper purpose, installed and operated convert surveillance in a
changeroom set aside for female emplo yees. He goes on further to state that if
m Vigneax (refer note lZd above) 505
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however some of the factors in this scenario are altered the difficulty of applying the
implied term becomes clear. What if the employees are male? What if the
surveillance was overt? What if it was authorized by an express term in contract of
emp loyment? What if the employer had no compelling rational for the surveillance,
but there was no evidence of an improper purpose? What if there was evidence that
drugs were being sold and consumed in the change rooms'What if several employees
had requested the surveillance because of the COnCelTIS about drug case~4
He also believes that the reason why Mr McCallum and Mr McCarry used the
changeroom example is because it involves a situation where employees have a
high expectation of privacy which is clearly open to employer abuse. He states that
in practice many other common electronic surveillance practices may lack the
impropriety or 'extreme and deliberate conduct' which is the requirement of the
implied duty of trust and confidence. He gives the following examples;
(a) Employees in the airline and retail industries could argue that covert and
overt video surveillance is justified in areas where theft is believed to have
occurred, or where there is high risk of theft.
(b) Employees in the call centre industry could justify audio monitoring by
reference to its training benefits and the need for quality control.
Cc) Employees in a range of white-collar professions could attempt to justify e-
mail surveillance on the basis that it enables the detection of sexual
harassment by e-mail (a common practice) as well as the misuse of sensitive
information by employees,
13.1 Sempill (refer note 130above) 128
1.14Ibid 129
The examples of different forms of surveill ance described above constitute
common commercial practice with clear business rationale bu1nevertheless the
court tradition reluctance to interfere with manag erial prerogative may make
them unwilling to regard any of them as an abuse of power.
Sempill' r" goes on further to state that some forms of electronic monitoring may
offend the implied duty of tru st and confidence there may be a range of legal and
practical reasons why the obli gation is unlikely , to offer workers a particularly
attractive means of resisting electronic workp lace surveillance. He states that
Stewart has noted 'litigation in the ordinary courts to assert basic employment
tights' would be an undesirable prospect for most employees and even unions,
given the unpredictable nature of the common law standards, the costs involved
and the difficulty of obtaining legal aid .
In Tap Wine Trading v Cape Classic Wines 136 the judge held that in the Conduct
of litigation the use of Civil litigation usage of 'trap' with regard to participant
electronic surveillance did not infringe any constitution al tights.
7.2 The role of videotapes as evidence of misconduct.
The admissibility of videotapes in labour disputes forums should not present as much
a problem as it does in a criminal trial but neverthe less it can raise substantial problem
in the law of Evidence since alth ough the onus in civil cases is a less rigorous one, the
admissibility of the video tape is a matter of law .
1.15 Sempill (refer note 130 above) 131
I.1 (, Tap Wine Trading \' Cape Classic IYines 1999 (4) SA 194
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Landman'r" observes that the advantages of a vid eo tape were summed up by Van
Dijkhoorst J in the Beleke case. The court said the following:
The video can be a very helpful tool to arrive at the truth. It does not suffer
from fading memory as witnesses do. The earnera may be selective but so is
the witness's recollection, even more so. The best word artist cannot draw his
verbal picture as accurately and as clearly as does the cold eye of the camera.
The tape retains for the benefit of court not only the words but also the
intimations and emphasis of the speaker and the audience.
He states that inProtea Technology/38 it was held that conducting secret surveillance
will invariably intrude on the private lights of the employee because it is more likely
than not those private and business related aspects will overlap or at least be captured
and thereafter be separated. The employer may face criminal charges ofcrimen
injuria but it does not seem that this will make the evidence elicited by secret means
inadmissible. He believes that the appropriate way to the admission of evidence
obtained in a covertness manner is that if a light that is protected by the Bill of Rights
has been infiinged then the onus has to be on the party that seeks to benefit in any
way from the infringement to satisfy the couli that the common law provides a
limitation to the nature referred to in Section 3 6(1) of the Constitution.
7.3 Defence of Property
The light to privacy appears not to enjoy a lot of emphasis when dealing with the
issue of defence of property. In UFCTiV, Local 1400 v Saskatchewan Co-Operative
D7Landman (1999) 9 Contemporary Labour Law 77 p78
nx Protea Technology Ltd and Another I' Wainer and Others (refer note 86 above)
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Association Lti 39, the employer adopted a loss prevention programme which
included hidden video cameras in the workplace to monitor activities within the
workplace as a means of investigating alleged thefts. The employer had not
communicated to the employees that he was going to set up caineras at the workplace.
The Court held that there was no breach of privacy tort because part ofin employer's
function is to investigate and bring to an end any activities which are causing its
business losses. This function according to Craig40 was recognised in
Saskstchewan's Privacy Act which permitted limitations of privacy indefence of
property.
The light to privacy in relation to defence of property needs to be exercised with
caution, this is illustrated specifically Mcf.allum and Mc Carry in the hypothetical
illustration whereby they state that there is a high expectation of privacy in a
changeroom. The case laws referred to also indicate that the light to privacy may be
limited by the use of surveillance cameras in those situations where an employer may
reasonably justify the need to have surveillance cameras in the workplace. If however
there is not justification then an employer would not violate employees light to
privacy under the disguise ofmanagerial prerogative and the light to manage.
7.4 Conclusion
Modern technology makes it imperative that the law must just catch up. It is not
possible to personally police employees as a way of guarding one's interests hence the
need to come up with other efficient means such as electronic surveillance.
139 UFCW Local 1400 \' Saskatchewan Co -Operative Association Ltd (1992) 101 Sask. R I (QB)
140 Craig (1999) P132
Nevertheless management cannot breach privacy under the pretext that it is
management prerogative to monitor what employees are doing and how they are
doing it. There needs to be reasonable consideration of the issue of mutual trust
between employees and employers which is fundamental in an employment
relationship.
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8 ADMISSIBILITY OF AND POLYGRAP H TESTING AT THE
WORKPLACE
According to Christianson'{' in Am erica it has been argued that having to take a
polygraph test in order to gain or protect employment is clearly an invasion of privacy
even if the results are never seen by anybody. Cra ig" had this to say about polygraph
testing;
Polygraph and personality testing con stitute profound intrusion into
the personal zone of privacy. Such tests are directed at the human
mind and thought, which are core interests protected by personal
pnvacy.
In the judgement of Long Beach City Employees Association v Long Beacli", the
Court found the practice of subjecting employees to polygraph testing to be an
invasion of privacy contrary to the California Constitution, because the questions
asked during the test were 'intimate' , embarassing' and 'outrageous' . Pooley!"
supports this in the sense tha t they believe that the use of polygraph testing to detect
deception in the workplace or anywhere else must result in unfairness and
discrimination.
Christianson 145 also states that the labour court and the CCMA have had to face the
challenge of deciding on the admi ssibility of pol ygraph testing. In the case oMncube
v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) ua'" and the unreported CCMA arbitration case of
Harmse v Rainbo w Farms (Pty) Ltd are and indication that the labour dispute
141M Chris tianso n 'Tm th Lies and Porn ogra phy ' eLL vol 8 no 1 Augus t ( 1998) 3
14' . ~ • ~
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resolution bodies are having to assess admiss ibilit y and reliability of polygraph tests
as did industrial courts more than ten years ago inMhlangu v ClM Delta 147 when
adjudicating misconduct in the workplace. In all these cases there was no specific
assessment of polygraph tests and procedures nor has there been any satisfactory
opinion on the legal admissibility of these tests.
It is however interesting to note that the CCMA and the labour court have arrived at
differing rulings regarding usage of polygraph tests at the workplace. InS'ACCA 'WU
obo Sydney Fongo v Pick 'n ' Pay Supermarket 148 the Commissioner accepted that
polygraph tests are fool-proof whilst inMahlangu v ClM Deltak; Gallant v ClM
Deltak149 it is said the court cannot ignore the preponderance of expert opinion which
holds the view that the use of a lie detector machine.v., .. is on scientific
psychological and ethical grounds reprehensible. Similarly inJacob v Unitrans
Engineering (1999) KN21921 150, the Commissioner said 'it is absurd to assume that a
man is guilty purely because he exercises a legitimate light to refuse to submit to a
test or answer a questionnaire.
In the case ofD S Sosibo & others and CTM I51 whereby a dismissal was based only
on the evidence of a polygraph test the Commissioner came to the following
conclusion;
'the results of a polygraph test are simply an indicator of deception. They do
not give details of the extent of misconduct which are essential in the
assessment of a sanction . ...The sole reliance by an employer on unspecific
146Mncube v Cash Pay master Servi ces (Ptl~ Ltd (\ 997) 5 BLLR 639 (CC MA)
147 •
Mhlangu v ClM Delta ILl Vol2 1 Jan 2000 p33
14X SACCA H'V obo Sydney Fongo v Pick 'n' Pal' Supermarket (2000) FS 15555
14'JM ahlang u v ClM Delt~k; Gallant v Cl M Deltak (1986) 7 ILl 346 (IC)
ISOJa cob v Unitrans Engi neeri ng (/ 999) KN21 9.. 1,
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polygraph results is insufficient to discharge the onus in terms of s 192 of the
LRA to prove that the dismissal was fair. To discharge this onus, the test of a
balance of probability is used ' .
8.1 Conclusion
An employer may In very limited circumstances use polygraph test but most
importantly an employer must prove on a balance of probability that an employee is
guilty of the alleged misconduct and only then may he use polygraph test as an
addition to the confirm evidence obtained by other investigative procedures. It is also
interesting to note the different decisions that have been arrived at by the
Commissioners regarding the usage of polygraph testing at work. Polygrapltesting
in my opinion involves substantiating one' s position beyond reasonable doubt and not
on a balance of probability as should be the case in employment matters.
151 D 5 Sosibo & others and CTM (200 I ) 22 ILJ 811(CCMA) P817
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9. CONCLUSION
The recently introduced legislation suggests that until now we were unprepared for
the legal challenges associated with highly advanced technology. Employers have
now no choice but to keep abreast of these changes since they have a direct bearing on
their companies, be it in the form of abuse or in the form of vicarious liability.
Employees also have to be accept that technology makes it easy for an employer to
check their productivity without necessarily asking them to account for their time.
This imbalance of power is nothing new as the employer has always had power over
employees.
Having surveyed the emerging, but as yet undeveloped, literature in thisarea , it is
clear that the tight to privacy take s two forms . An invasion of privacy may assume the
form of an unlawful intrusion on the personal privacy of another or the unlawful
publ ication ofprivate facts about a person.
From the case law discussed in this dissertation it would appear that the light to
privacy is a two stage enquiry. First whether the conduct complained of amounts to
an infringement. Second if there has been an infringement, it must be determined
whether such infringement is necessary. One thing that emerges clearly is that where
an employer did not seek consent of emplo yees before engaging in practices that may
be regarded as invasion ofprivacy then that employer would have to justify why such
. . .
invasion I S necessary.
The courts appear to balance the tight to privacy with the public interest in a majority
of cases . It also takes into account human dignity in the execution of the tight to
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discipline. One thing however that still remains unresolved is at what stage can an
employee be said to cease having the right to privacy, especially given the fact that we
spend a great deal of our tirne at the workplace. I do not believe that the court is
saying that once we leave the domain of our light then it means we no longer cease to
exist as individuals with tights. It is however important to note that employers are not
under any obligation to allow employees to utilise an employer's property for
personal use. Employees are allowed to make use of the property because an
employer accepts that employees have private lives which do not disappear just
because they are at the workplace.
With respect to workplace disputes it is generally acknowledged that an employer has
the light to discipline employees guilty of misconduct. The courts also appear to be
vigilant that the tight of workers, especially to privacy, are generally protected but not
at the expense of the interest of the employer. It is the nature of the employment
relationship that the worker should accept that his or her tights are not absolute but
are mediated by workplace dynamics, societal interests and other similar
considerations.
It is also critical for employers to have policies on workplace pnvacy to avoid
situations where employees will accuse their employers of invading their privacy. The
policy will also serve as a guide on instances such as dismissing employees as well as
the various actions to be taken into account before such dismissal can take place. It
will also guide those employees that may be unaware of the sensitivity of other issues
that may be regarded as hUlTIOrOUS by one person only to be regarded offensive by
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another person. The policy will therefore facilitate transparency regarding what may
lead to a dismissal and what may not lead to a dismissal,
The other question that still needs to be addressed is what should be the limits
regarding an employer's power to monitor. When can it be said that there is enough
monitoring without necessarily 'invading' privacy 'indefinitely' . The constant
monitoring may result in some hostility from employees who may not have full
appreciation for monitoring. They may view this as lack of trust on the pati of the
employer.
The Regulation of Interception of Communication and Provisions of Communication-
Related Information Act which came into operation on the 30 December 2002 may
address some of the challenges that face employers in that there is clarity that
employers' need to seek written consent of employees before any kind of interception
or monitoring can take place. The Act however does not address the scenario where
and employer accesses the employee's computer and discoveramauthorised content.
Whether such conduct constitutes an infringement of the employees constitutional as
well as common law right to privacy and consequentlycrimen iniuria, where the
employer failed to obtain the employee's oral and written consent or failed to inform
him in advance of the computer use policy, remains an open question. Because of the
many complex and unanswered questions that arise from the Act, the best way is for
the employer to obtain the employees oral or written consent or failed to inform him
in advance of the computer use policy, remains an open question.
The complexities and unanswered questions that mise out of the Act mean that the
best way is for the employer to seek written consent for the purposes of interception.
Once the employee has consented, issues of privacy and ambit of the Act falls away
entirely. If an employee refuses consent, the employer can withdraw access to the
electronic communication system if this does not amount to a unilateral change in the
employee's contract of employment
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